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THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW. By Daniel J. Boorstin. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xviii, 257. $3.00.
THERE is a great temptation in reviewing Mr Boorstin's book to go off
the deep end about it in a burst of eulogy. It is subtle, ingenious, witty and
learned. It presents Blackstone against the intellectual background of the
eighteenth century and focusses on him so many lights of different color and
intensity that we are astonished to see that somewhat pompous and stodgy
gentleman gleam and glow in a strange phosphorescence.
Blackstone was, in Mr. Boorstin's view, a typical child of the eighteenth
century and eager to show that the English law was indeed a science, that
is to say, a rationally coherent body of facts. It became, further, the
"mysterious science" of the book's title, because this rational coherence
resulted in a perfection of beaut, that was its own justification.
TMr. Boorstin makes a triple division of his book and names his three
divisions "Nature", "Reason" and 'alues". The English law had to be
shown to be a "natural" growth under the eighteenth century special concept
of "nature": it had to be displayed as "rational" or it would not be acceptable
to an age of reason. And finally it secured three values: "life" -taken by
Mr. Boorstin as equivalent to "humanity" -"liberty" and "property."
I think Mr. Boorstin is right about the character and purpose of the Com-
mentaries, but he need not have been quite so mysterious or scientific himself.
Blackstone was engaged in the special task of justifying the way of lav.yers
to English gentlemen, who were also students or fellows of O.ford and had
therefore had the most nearly complete education England could give. It
is true that Oxford was in the days of the Commentaries at the lowest intel-
lectual depths of its long history, but none the less the audience could be
supposed to be supplied with Latin and some Greek and with a fairly ex-
tensive knowledge of ancient history and the Bible. Besides they read the
new books of poetry and history as they came out -there were not too
many - and had a gentlemanly detached interest in the philosophic contro-
versies of the day, which included the physical and biological sciences.
That Blackstone would be more intent to make the law seem rational and
good to this audience than he would have had to be if he were talking to the
apprentices of the Inn or the Temple we can quite understand. He says
clearly what he meant to do and why, in his introductory lecture. (1, 5, 6)
"A competent knowledge of the laws of that society in which we live is the
proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar; an highly useful,
I had almost said essential, part of liberal and polite education." It was the
strange fate of a book intended to enable gentlemen to use law as a subject
of polite conversation, that it became, as Mr. Boorstin rightly points out,
the chief source of the law itself for lawyers, judges and administrators in
the outer regions successively occupied by the common law. Indeed it served
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this latter purpose better than the former. In spite of the successful effort
to turn the language of the law into cultivated eighteenth century English,
laymen in England were not beguiled into reading the book or talking about
it. The University of California possesses a copy of the first edition, sub-
scribed to and doubtless paid for by Mr. Edward Gibbon. It is in mint
condition. There is not a fingermark on the broad expanse of margin. The
evidence is strong that it had never been opened by the subscriber.
But it was widely read-and discussed by laymen in the Colonies and in
France and these persons were interested neither in the quaint lore of
incorporeal hereditaments nor even in the rational beauty and perfection of
a system devised by the noble, if rude, Anglo-Saxon ancestors of the English
people. They leaped with avidity upon it as an authoritative statement of
the fundamental rights of men and Englishmen -rights which no King or
Parliament could take away. The "Liberty Boys" of the Colonies, who took
the place of modern Anarchists and Communists in the eyes of most respect-
able persons, paraded the streets with placards proclaiming the rights of
"Life, Liberty and Property" just as Blackstone had enumerated them. And
many of the cahiers sent to the Legislative Assembly of France in 1789 and
1790 began with passages taken from the great work of Monsieur Black-
stone, which was translated into French almost at once and had a wide
circulation among the men who made the Revolution.
It was generally admitted that to have couched the law in "elegant" language
- Jefferson's word for Blackstone- was quite a feat; but it did the law
little good with the public, and did Blackstone little good with lawyers.
Elegance could not overcome the ancient grudge the laity nourished against
the law. Bentham was willing to admit that Blackstone had turned the "jar-
gon" of lawyers into English, but it remained a jargon of ideas nonetheless,
thought Bentham, and with him all the English rationalists and moralists.
For Mr. Boorstin neglects to note that Blackstone's book is essentially an
apology, as, in a way, Bracton's book was in the heyday of the rediscovery
of Roman law and Fortescue's book undisguisedly was in the flood of the
Reception. Bracton solved his problem by incorporating huge masses of
undigested Glossator doctrine into his statement of English law, and Fortescue
by an argument point by point and institution by institution. Blackstone had
a more difficult task. Educated English lawyers had been restive since the
early seventeenth century over the difficulties presented by fitting their feudal
legal heritage into the new methods of thought initiated by Descartes. Coke
had prepared "Institutes" which were an agglutination of materials rather
than an organization of them. But Finch and Cowell had attempted a more
systematic arrangement, and Hale had at least contemplated one. It was in
the seventeenth century that "text books" on special subject matters first
appear in English law. The Commentaries were the culmination of these
attempts, the most successful, partly because it was a culmination and also
because, by a curious paradox, the Tory and Royalist judge who disdained
enthusiasts, furnished the catchwords for rebels and doctrinaires.
Mr. Boorstin points out - indeed, he notes it in the citation from Franklin
facing his first page -that Blackstone is at pains to rationalize the discord-
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ances of the English law and to gloze over its barbarities. I doubt that Black-
stone or his contemporaries would have denied it. He was speaking some-
what as an advocate. But that he was so deliberate in his efforts and so
self-deceived as Mr. Boorstin supposes, is, I think, an error.
There is a slight air of sardonic banter- almost of derision- in Mr.
Boorstin's tone, which Blackstone does not deserve. It was Coke, not Black-
stone, who thought the common law - not the statute law - the "perfection
of reason", and he meant that phrase as a criterion by which to reject state-
ments of law of which he did not approve. Blackstone was far from thinking
the common law perfect. He thought it was better in many important
respects than the existing law of the Continent- in which he was quite
right- and its marked inferiority to the Roman law in order and system he
believed he had himself partly remedied by introducing the very elegance
which Thomas Jefferson made a reproach to him.
Certainly Blackstone was neither a profound thinker nor a keen analyst.
And to catch him up on confusion of terms or on solemn tautologies is not
difficult. Unfortunately our ingrained dislike of analysis has betrayed many
writers much keener than Blackstone and mdre learned. But not all illus-
trations that Mr. Boorstin uses show as fuddled a mind as he makes Black-
stone's seem. The maxim or rule or principle that the law will not suffer
a right to be without a remedy, doubtless appears to be a pure tautology,
if we remember that unless there is a remedy, there is no way of recognizing
a right. But in Ashby v. Whitc1 it was given a practical meaning. Again,
if one of the inseparable incidents in the creation of a tenancy at sufferance
is the neglect of the landlord to oust the hold-over tenant, and if the Crovn
cannot be guilty of neglect it follows that there can be no tenancy by suffer-
ance from the Crown. The fact that the word "because" is used does not
make this conclusion meaningless. "Because" does not imply philosophical
causation. And the objection Mr. Boorstin raises to the statement is the
regrettable fact that in all logical arguments, the conclusion must have been
contained in the premises. That happens to be the way men think. It is still
true in the words cited from Locke2 that "God has not been so sparing to
men to make them barely two-legged creatures and left it to Aristotle to
make them rational." If we dared credit Locke with a witticism, we might
call this one.
Many other of the special characteristics Air. Boorstin assigns to the
Commentaries are much less forced on Blackstone by his need to make law
a science and a mystic experience, than taken over from accepted tradition.
The distinction between the "law of persons" and the "law of things" is
a Roman Law distinction at least as old as Gains and already a commonplace
even in English law. Mr. Boorstin makes the entertaining suggestion, en-
forced by an especially apt illustration,3 that Blackstone regarded the un-
resolved vestiges of barbarism in the law somewhat as one might regard
ancient ruins left in a formal garden, not without value as decoration. That
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seems true enough, but so did most of the eighteenth century lawyers to
whom legal history was "antiquities" and all the better for a little savagery,
Mr. Boorstin does some justice to Blackstone's place as a historian. I-Ie
was really a better historian than Reeves who followed him. Compared to
the infantile credulity of Coke, his method was a model of critical acumen.
Certainly he was not the equal of Madox or Spelman, but he came to grip
with texts and he attempted to balance traditions, somewhat as his great
contemporaries Gibbon and Robertson did. It is not altogether strange that
he still clung to the Saxon origin of Magna Carta. It took another century
to shake that venerable fable. It may also be said that his interest in com-
parative law was more than part of a studied plan to prove the "natural"
character of English law. Comparisons were in the air, doubtless in the
effort to find what was natural in human institutions, but at least in part
because of the general stimulus given the inquiring mind since the creation
of the modern world by Galileo and Descartes. Barrington on the Statutes
had gone into comparisons largely, and Sir William, a Doctor of the Civil
Law and a Fellow of All Souls, would be at great fault if he omitted Roman,
Greek and Hebrew analogues,
I find myself quite at odds with Mr. Boorstin in his last section on Black-
stone's "values". It is wrong to call "life, liberty and property", a "trich-
otomy", because it was not meant to be exhaustive. And Blackstone's refer-
ences to the "humanity" of the English law was not merely an expansion
of the notion of life as a protected "value". "Humanity" was an additional
value. Nor was he wrong in ascribing it to a penal system, which with all
its faults, had no torture-the piene forte et dure was obsolescent and soon
abolished - no crimes d'6tat, no lettres de cachet and did have habeas corpus
and public trials.
Mr. Boorstin is hard to satisfy. Is "common sense" always obscurantism?
And is "authority" always a mystic justification and "equity" merely a
glandular reaction? The trouble is that we cannot get premises for our
legal syllogism except from common sense or equity or authority and while
future Blackstones may be less naive than Mr. Boorstin thinks Blackstone
was, they will have to work much on his lines.
Where Mr. Boorstin is, I should' say, most seriously wrong in his pre-
,sentation is in his constant assumption that Blackstone took all the law to
have the beauty and perfection he assigns to much of it: Blackstone does
not think he is describing the community of angels to which the judicious
Hooker devoted a chapter. He is conscious indeed of the English law's
deficiencies and of the fact that there are moral rights of unquestioned validity
which the law does not protect. The relations of parents and children, as he
describes them, furnishes several illustrations. And his protest against capital
punishment for trivial offenses is both dignified and sincere. Finally, to
declare that Blackstone regarded life and liberty as subordinate to the acqui-
sition of property by commerce is without justification in the text or in
the society of the time. Many of the gentlemen landowners who heard
Blackstone and sent their younger sons to the bar had less interest than
Mr. Boorstin imagines in what became in the American Revolution the
struggle against the fetters of commerce.
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Mr. Boorstin has opened up new vistas. I wish he would continue and
explore one vista that opens out on Giambattista Vico and the nita.a scicnza.
Or another that dealt exhaustively with the controversies the Commentaries
excited. That the book as it stands is a notable achievement is unquestion-
able.
MAX RnIN-t
MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS.
Published under the direction of the Julius Rosenthal Foundation, North-
western University. Boston: Boston Law Book Co., 1941. Pp. -ii, 321.
$5.00.
WHEN I read the publisher's blurb, that the sixteen contributors to this
volume were the foremost legal minds of America, and found listed, fourteen
professors of law,' and two of philosophy, and not a single one of those
'naif and simple minded men," the judges, I for a while repented of my
promise to review it. But only for a while, for I remembered my brief
metempsychosis some years ago, when, for a moment of glory, I had felt
the soul of the judge moving out, the soul of the professor moving in. I
remembered too what I had then found out and publicly announced,2 that,
their philosophical pretensions notwithstanding, our learned men of the
law are subject to the same influences making for error, are engaged in the
same kind of synthetic thinking, as the rest of us, and that with most of
them as with us, it is in a large sense more than metaphorically true, "that
a fact is nothing except in relation to desire."3
What Hobbes had had to say of wisdom,4 of pedantry,5 and of philosophy,'
came to mind to fortify me and remenbering that I myself had written some-
tProfessor of Law, University of California.
1. One of them, John Dickinson, whose fine paper breathes the spirit and ehibits
the skill of the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer, is indeed given a secondary listing as 6ne.
2. The Vorm Tunis, or a Judge Tries Teaching (1932) 27 IL.. L REv. 355.
3. "From the same it proceedeth that men give different names to one and the
same thing, from the difference of their own passions; as they tiat approve a private
opinion call it opinion, but they that mislike it, heresy; and yet heresy signifieth no more
than private opinion but has only a greater tincture of choler." Hons, LEnTxi,%I;
(Morley's ed. 1886) 54.
4. "That words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them. But they
are the money of fools that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a
Thomas, or by any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man." Id. at 25.
5. "For a man to forsake his ov natural judgment and be guided by general
sentences read in authors and subject to many e-xceptions, is a sign of folly and generally
scorned in the name of pedantry." Id. at 31.
6. "That no living creature but man only is subject to absurdity, and cof men th#
are of all most subject to it that profess philosophy, that there can be nothing so absurd
but may be found in the books of philosophers." Id. at 29.
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thing about this same law,7 and had even been invited to contribute to the
volume under review, I threw off doubt and diffidence and entered boldly
upon my task.
Keeping in mind the purpose of the sponsors, to produce not a mere col-
lection of papers lacking in definite unity but a symposium, exhibiting variety
and diversity indeed, but yet forming a coherent whole, I have read each
paper not once but many times, to find whether and to what extent, there
is a common thread on which each is strung, or whether each stands a thing
apart, wrapped in the solitude of its own originality. Originality I do find
in angle of approach, method of treatment, placing of emphasis, and above
all, in style. Otherwise, each contributor, with a few exceptions, instead of
laying claim to a philosophy of law peculiar to himself, has broken free of
the embarrassingly personal and limiting connotations of the title, to take
a more general view. Viewing law abstractly and ideally, in its timeless,
contentless and universal aspects, as controller, as binding force, abstracted
from the institutions it sanctions, the results it brings about, the things on,
and the means by, which its force is exerted, each has made his contribution,
some far more effectively than others, to the discussion and the understand-
ing of law so viewed. Though each presents a different aspect of it, the
papers as a whole present this thing men call law, as it has manifested itself
in the never-ending conflict between rule and discretion, the absolute and the
relative, the fixed and the changing, the predictable and the unpredictable,
as it affects or is affected by the establishment of law as order, the struggle
for laws as means, the development of law as purpose.
Asking and answering the age old question, "Why seek ye the living
among the dead?", the papers, as a whole, make it clear, I think, that
as life is always in flux, so law, that explanation of its social implications
and consequences which lawyers and judges as life's spokesmen in that
field are forever making and remaking, must also be; that law is a living
thing and like all living things, modifies and grows, and growing, lives;
and that though the understandardized and unscientific because very human
sense of justice, which these views enshrine, is a high price to pay for
liberty, it is not too high.
They make it clear too, that we may look ever confidently to the life
which we see evolving all around us, to continue to release forces and set
in motion agencies to make and keep the law we live by less rigidly stan-
dardized, more responsively humanistic, and therefore the social order in
which it operates, less mechanized, less standardized, less hopelessly despair-
ing. But clear as they make it, that the glory point of the law is a kind of
"glorious uncertainty", they make it clearer still that this uncertainty is
the result not of caprice, but of the application of broad but not over-
generalized principles which, subjected to a more or less inconstant process
of examination and re-examination, operate within more or less defined
7. This Thing Men Call Law (1934) 2 U. OF Cnii. L. REv. 1; The Judgtment
Intuitive: The Fuwtion of the "Hunch" it Judicial Decision (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 274;
LAW AS LIBERATOR (1937) ; The Glorious Uncertahity of Our Lady of the Law (August
1939) 23 Am. JuD. Soc. j. 73.
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limits under the restraining influence of understood and received rules and
practices.
Reading what they have written, a discerning student of the lax will
understand why it is that finite justice, which has its seat in the enlightened
conscience of mankind, has been the nearest attained and the best admin-
istered when the actual law has struck the best balance the times admit of
between sympathy and a strong and enlightened common sense, when, in
short, the pure claim of a particular demandant is examined and disposed of,
in the light not merely of its own appeal, but of those social considerations,
out of which wisdom and prudence and a strong common sense, from time
to time, extract principles for the guidance of human affairs.
Now this is not, of course, to say that in each paper taken by itself, all
of this appears, nor that each contributes its due part to the whole. It is
to say though, that-differing as each does in assumptions, in point of view,
and in emphasis-taken together, they treat of this irridescent thing men
call law in its most illusive and entrancing phases, its ever changing content
under the steady pressure of the changing life it serves and rules. It is to
say too, that no single one of them, not even the super-realist, the "never
yet dearly apprehended" Bingham, with his passion for telling us not what
law is but what it is not, as though he believed of it as the farmer did of the
giraffe, "There ain't no such animal", with his demand, "that we banish
from our professional tenets, the absurd dogma, 'A government of laws and
not of men' ", would want to see the law a whirling kaleidoscope of change,
the administrators of law entirely free of its control. No single one of them,
not even Kennedy, with his loyalty to "scholasticism, the old", his enmity
to "realism, the new" jurisprudence, his unquestioning belief in natural la,
would want to see law rendered impervious to change. All are in agreement
with Locke that law is, in its essence, not the restrainer of men's liberties
but the giver of them. The real point of difference between the extreme
"realists" self styled and all the rest, comes in the emphasis on who and
what is to be restrained, who and what is to be liberated, how and by whom
the restraints are to be applied.
'A brief individual word about some of the papers and I have done. Wig-
more, by confining himself rigidly in manner and substance to what he
correctly calls a classification of legal thinking, deprives us, I think, of a
contribution which, if written in his charming, free style, and from the
fullness of his living and thinking, might well have been the sparkplug of
the book. Upon Powell, the subject has had a quieting and gentling effect.
Bullfighter extraordinary in the constitutional field, he seems in this broader
one, as ox-eyed and tender as any Ferdinand of ours. Cook, Kocourek,
and M oore, seem to me too much concerned with certain highly technical
prepossessions, Cook with his socio-scientific, Kocourek with his mathe-
matico-physical, Moore with his behaviouristic point of view. Moore's effort
is particularly Beamish-Boyish. To me, Bible Belt Born, and a legally
accredited representative of the rough element in our profession, that is,
those who went neither to Harvard nor to Yale, it seems a perfect illus-
tration of what might be produced by one who, for too long has devoted
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himself to too much about too little and too little about too much until lie
has come to know everything about nothing and nothing about everything,
and is just ripe for a Deanship. Reading it almost reconciled me to not having
gone to Yale. Cohen, with his forthright challenge of the sweeping claims
of the inductionists, his downright defense of deduction, his brushing away
the cobwebs that have prevented some of us from thinking clearly on this
matter of the place of induction and deduction in the law, has made a real
contribution. Dewey's paper, while brief and to the point and good enough
in its way, is, I think, a little academic, a little primerish. Fuller, Patterson,
and Greene, each in his own characteristic fashion, makes a distinctive con-
tribution to the whole. But to me, the outstanding papers are those of
Dickinson, Pound, Llewelyn, and Radin. Dickinson's is perhaps the best
modern paper I have read on the eternal truth of Madison's statement, that
in forming a government of men over men, the first difficulty is this, to
enable the government to control the governed, the next, "to oblige the
government to control itself." Llewelyn, while still, to an extent, style bound
and realism haunted, shows in the deepening maturity of the all around view
he takes in this paper, how true it is that knowledge comes but wisdom
lingers. While Pound, in his thorough and ineluctable way, and Radin, less
severely logical but equally satisfying, at once pose and dispose of the
essential questions law-men meet, when they think and write about this
thing called law. JosEPHr C. HUTcHIESON, J .t
THE QUEST FOR LAw. By William Seagle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1941. Pp. xv, 439. $5.00.
FOR many years now in the field of medicine there have been available
to the practitioner, student, and layman valuable introductory texts tracing
the history and describing the techniques of the discipline. But in the field
of law such works have been few in number, and these few antiquated and
inadequate. An attempt is being made, however, to eliminate this cultural
lag; and in the last several years we have seen published more what-you-
should-know-about-the-law books than in decades before. This phenomenon
can perhaps be explained as a by-product of the President's attempt to
reorganize the Supreme Court, which focused public attention on the ration-
ale of judicial review, the nature of the judicial process, and the character
of the work of the legal profession. Of the recent books of this genre Max
Radin's The Law and Mr. Smith, published in 1938, deserved much more
notice than the others, and more notice than it has received, for it was by
far the most adequate answer to the need for a descriptive and critical guide.
Now Radin's book must share honors with The Quest for Law. Since the
orientation of the former is mainly philosophical, and of the latter mainly
tJudge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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historical, the books complement each other, and taken together constitute
a balanced study.
The history of law is presented by Ir. Seagle from the point of view
of increasing complexity. Apart from survivals he finds three types of
law that reveal distinguishable aspects, namely, primitive, archaic, and mature
law. Primitive law is customary law, and is to be found among hunters and
herdsmen who have not yet developed courts. Archaic law obtains among
peoples who have adjudicating officials or courts, which constitute "the basic
institution of every legal system." This is the law of almost all ancient
peoples, African tribes, and the Germans at the time of the decline of the
Roman Empire. It is the law of feudalism and slavery. Mature law is fu.und
wherever lawyers (not simply courts) have appeared. "AU the complex
characteristics of mature legal systems are conditioned by the dominance
of professional lawyers." It is the law of Greece, Rome, and modern capi-
talism.
Mr. Seagle employs this classification to orient his survey of the origin
and development of legal institutions, which takes about tvo-thirds of the
book. In the last third of the book this classification is disregarded to
afford the author leeway to discuss such topics as the higher-law doctrine,
judicial supremacy, administrative law, international law and the nature of
justice.
Unless the reader is cautious he is likely to be misled by the structure
of the book: Book II is called "Primitive Law", Book III is called "Archaic
Law", and Book IV "The Maturity of Law". This creates the impression
that there is such a thing as universal law which has gone through these
three stages of development. For what else can the author intend by this
structure, this "Gestalt", especially when one bears in mind his purpose
to present law from the point of view of increasing complexity? The fact,
however, is that the author does not envision a universal history of law,:, a
continuous stream having its source in a spring in the Garden of Eden,
because, if there were such a continuous stream, such a universal history,
how could mature law be the law of both the Roman Empire and modern
capitalism? What 'r. Seagle means is that the legal system of each people
shows the three stages in its development, so that at the saine ime primitive
law may exist in one place, archaic law in a second place, and mature la,-
in a third place. It would have led to greater clarity had Mr. Seagle followed
a plan which would have permitted him to trace the legal development of
specific peoples and to leave for summary chapters the formulation of in-
ductive generalizations.
Another source of misunderstanding, unless the reader is -very cautious,
is the author's emphasis on the definition of mature law in terms of its
professional character, which creates the impression that Mr. Seagle con-
ceives mature law to be fundamentally lawyer-made. While "Mr. Seagle
occasionally attempts to keep in sight the property and social relations which
are the matrix of law, the occasional mention of these relations is insufficient
to mark their transcendent importance. Marx and Engels, it will be recalled,
by over-emphasizing the property relations and by paying insufficient atten-
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tion to the traditions, techniques and interests of the legal profession, com-
mitted the converse of Mr. Seagle's sin, a fact which Engels acknowledged
in a letter to Conrad Schmidt. Mr. Seagle was probably aware of the lack
of balance in Marxist writings and tried to avoid it; but instead of steering
a middle course, which is difficult but not impossible, he creates the im-
pression of having avoided Scylla only to run into Charybdis.
The book here and there unfortunately shows the evolutionary stages of
the authors thought without revision in the light of conclusions finally
accepted. For instance, in discussing the theory that adjudication arose out
of arbitration, on page 60, Mr. Seagle says that the theory "for all its
plausibility probably has no foundation in fact." On page 61 lie says that
the process of arbitration or mediation "is no more the origin of the judicial
function than the singing encounter of the Eskimo. . . . The appearance
of courts represents an independent evolution." On page 62 he speaks of
"the falseness of the arbitral theory of the court"; and on page 64 he says:
"It must be apparent now why the first courts did not evolve from arbi-
trators, but destroyed them." Also, now and then Mr. Seagle brings in
a fact which, for all its spiciness, is totally irrelevant and discordant; e.g.,
in speaking of Livy in connection with the Twelve Tables, Mr. Seagle
reminds us that Livy is also the author of a mythical sex scandal involving
Appius Claudius; in speaking of Bartolus, the author tells us that the
jurist would scatter money to the populace "as he rode along the streets
of Bologna on a horse with gorgeous trappings"; in telling us that Black-
stone did not go beyond the description of English law as it existed in his
time, he calls attention to the fact that Blackstone was a Tory with a great
fondness for port. But despite its flaws the book is an important contribu-
tion to legal literature, and can be read (and even studied) with great profit.
MILTON R. IKONVITZj
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROP-
ERTY. By James A. Gathings. With an introduction by Edwin Borchard.
Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 1940. P. xiv,
143. $3.00.
WHILE not yet a formal belligerent, the United States registered and finger-
printed aliens," announced a Black List,2 "froze" credits owned by the
nationals of disfavored states, 3 imposed export controls, 4 and seized ships.r
These measures have been hailed abroad as stopping leaks in the "blockade"
t Lecturer in Law, New York University.
1. ALIEN REGIsmATioN AcT, 54 STAT. 673 (1940), 8 U. S. C. A. §§ 451-52 (Supp.
1940).
2. First proclaimed July 17, 1941; see 5 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 41 (July 19, 1941).
3. See, e.g., summary given in 4 DEr 'T STATE BULL. 718 (June 14, 1931).
4. See, e.g., 4 Dzr'T STATE BuLL. 91-92 (June 18, 1941).




imposed by the democratic powers as part of the war of attrition in which
they are engaged.0 On the other side of the ledger, the Axis Powers are
engaged in forcing in occupied countries new industrial combinations and
new stock issues,7 in order to secure the economic control to which they
aspire. The pattern is reminiscent of that of twenty-five years ago. Mr.
Gathings efficiently and briefly refreshes the memory of what the world
has done before, what has gone before in the United States, and points what
may be expected in the months to come.
With careful and objective craftsmanship, he opens the discussion with
a concise summary of the background of the position of enemy property in
treaties, in judicial decisions, in executive practice, and in technical com-
ment, and develops the rule of international law which had grown up under
this fused practice. He then turns to the practice in the United States during
the Revolution. To a public already conditioned by popular novels to find
mistreatment of the Loyalist faction, Mr. Gathings' incisive documentation
of state and federal action should present no shock, but rather re-enforcing
evidence. In fifteen pages, he gives the legislative and judicial record, whose
arbitral counterpart in primary materials has been set forth by judge John
Bassett Moore.8 Then, analyzing the treaty patterns, the executive policy
and judicial decisions, he shows the cleavage between the courts and the
executive in subsequent years and establishes the dominant policy of the
United States up to the period of the last war- respect for alien enemy
property. Up to this point, he has concerned himself with conventional
issues, already well known to international lawyers.
When, however, he turns to the period of the last war, he opens up a
new field. It is strangely significant that, while there is an expansive French
and German literature on the treatment of enemy property in the last war,
there is a dearth of Anglo-American material. Whether the lack is born
of indifference to its fate or to a Bostonian sense of rectitude, or whether
it comes from an administrative refusal to report or to open the archives,
hitherto more characteristic of the continent, is immaterial. The fact remains
that primary materials on the Anglo-American treatment of alien property
are hard-come by; and that there is only slight discussion of it in secondary
sources. The burden of proof which Mr. Gathings has had to shoulder is
a heavy one but, by and large, he has sustained it.
The chapter on European practice, so important for comparative purposes,
is carefully done so far as the statute and case record is concerned, but
makes one wish that Mr. Gathings had pressed his investigation further.
The administrative side of the picture is largely lacking. His thesis would
have added force, it is submitted, and his discussion of American practice
been thrown into higher relief, had he shown evidence such as that even
in war-wrecked Belgium there were grave doubts as to the wisdom of liquida-
6. See, e.g., (Sept. 13, 1941) 141 BRrrisH EcoNOxMxsr 314.
7. See, e.g.. O1scn, No-way under German Occupalhm (August 2, 1941) 4 Foram
Com-I=cE WEEKLY 3.
8. 3 INTERPNATIONAL ADJUDIcATION: PRE-VAR Dmrrs: AaiTmT'io-. UYfMf JAY
TREATY (1794), ARTiCLE 6. (Modern ser. 1931).
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tion,9 that there was abuse of the sale power given the custodian in many
countries,10 that petitions charging confiscation of enemy property were heard
before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations," and many other
issues of a like nature.
In his discussion of the American treatment of enemy property, both during
and after the war, Mr. Gathings has used the interesting device of exam-
ining legislative and administrative policy, both in terms of its own expres-
sion and in its interpretation by the courts. He points again to a cleavage
-the legislature avoiding confiscation and avowing respect for enemy prop-
erty and the courts sustaining liquidation when such issues were presented
to them. He stresses a point, particularly pertinent in our present situation,
namely, the custodian's sale practices and decision to nationalize enemy prop-
erty, made at a time when Congress was affirming its intention not to
confiscate but to return this property. His precise marshalling of primary
materials, congressional and executive, is a contribution, for which those
who have a concern for the future of private property owe him a debt of
gratitude, as do those who in the months ahead will compare the impact
of the new legislation upon foreign investment in the United States. It is
an accurate chart of American sequestration practices.
The final chapter on the future treatment of enemy property in the United
States is already meeting the test of practice. The bitterness of the last war
with its consequent' economic competition never faded enough to produce
either the codification of international law on this point or a new treaty
pattern, which in Mr. Gathings' opinion might have helped cure the problem.
The bitter fruits of sequestration and of nationalization of enemy property
are again maturing in the political orchard. How full of gall and wormwood
they may 'be, Mr. Gathings has shown in impartial detail. His hope that
there may be sequestration followed by return of the property after the war
seems built on shifting sands, in view of the custodian's policies in the United
States and abroad during the last war. In the background of what is now
being done under the guise of war legislation, and in view of the tendency
in domestic practice to nationalize essential industries without adequate com-
pensation, Mr. Gathings' book makes grim reading for those who hope to
see safety for private enterprise and for foreign investment in the future.
Perhaps his chart of past actions will help avoid the pitfalls of past ex-
perience. At least it will clarify the record for future historians.
PHOEBE MORRISONt
9. See, e.g., the discussion which is recorded in (1921) jOURNAL DES TRUnuAUX
passim, and the answer to the confiscation charge, made in Project de lois siir le
s~questre et la liquidation des biens ennenis no. 67, Doc. iARL. (CHAM tE) No. 350,
pp. 1060-63 (1919-20).
10. See, e.g., the intimation that the Administration of New Guinea had made
"a very bad bargain" in the sale of plantations, League of Nations Document, C.341.-
M.99.1928.VI.27; 1928.VI.A.9.27 (June 13, 1928).
11. See, e.g., the petition of the Kaoko Land-und Minen Gesellschaft, a Berlin
corporation doing business in Southwest Africa, League of Nations Document, C.568.-
M.179.1928.VI.255 et seq.; 1928.VI.A.14.255 et seq.
tResearch Associate in International Law, Yale Law School.
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THE VOTING TRUST. By John Anton Leavitt. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1941. Pp. 216. $2.50.
T is volume covers in a general way the various ramifications of the
voting trust device and seeks to evaluate its desirability in the corporate
world of today. Not written by a lawyer nor solely for the legal profession,
it necessarily intrudes upon the lawyer's province as the author himself
recognizes by his chapter entitled The Law of Voting Trusts. As such the
volume may properly be assayed from the lawyer's viewpoint.
Commencing with chapters on the nature and history of voting trusts,
the book goes on to take up in separate chapters the voting trust agreement,
uses of voting trusts, voting trustees, and security holders under voting
trusts. After the legal chapter referred to above, it concludes with an analysis
of The Case for and against Voting Trusts. The author's final recommenda-
tion is the prohibition of voting trusts in some instances and their severe
restriction in others. Specific reforms are suggested, with the desirability
in principle with which few would quarrel. From the practical standpoint,
however, several of them are of so general a nature as to be meaningless.
One cannot refrain from speculating on why a volume of this kind was
undertaken and carried through to publication. Perhaps the explanation is
that the voting trust is a very simple and remarkably effective device for
corporate control which has the additional appealing quality of tangibility.
As a consequence it has caught the attention of many writers and has
received more notice than it deserves. The author here seems to have un-
fortunately succumbed to this sort of fatal lure.
The subject of voting trusts is simply too sterile to merit the lengthy
treatment accorded it in the present volume. There is nothing difficult about
the voting trust device which requires extended explanation, except possibly
intricate questions of draftsmanship - a matter with which this volume does
not attempt to deal. The desirability of the voting trust as a matter of policy
has been fully debated and it is clear that the ultimate issue is the use to
which a particular voting trust has been put. It can obviously be utilized
in an improper manner and legislative as well as judicial controls are needed.
But all this could be dealt with in considerably less than two hundred pages.
The book itself is needlessly repetitious and includes much unnecessary
material which could more wisely have been omitted. Aside from the chapters
on the history of voting trusts and on voting trustees (who they are, their
financial interests, and whom they represent), the book fails to hold the
reader's interest, especially that of a lawyer. While a thorough study was
made of innumerable voting trust agreements, the results of such research
inevitably tend to appear as a deadening recital of technical provisions. In
other respects the work relies heavily on secondary authorities, particularly
to provide a basis for discussion. At times this reliance is so marked that
the book becomes nothing but a compendium of existing literature on vuting
trusts. An up-to-date touch is given by frequent reference to the work of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, but the tedious outline in the text
of relevant provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is neither enlivening nor is it in a form to be of use
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to the practitioner. Reference is appropriately made to the Commission's
attitude toward voting trusts under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, but
its administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 is
strangely neglected. The inclusion as Appendix II of the now out-moded
Federal Trade Commission's Form F-1 for registration of voting trust cer-
tificates under the 1933 Act is an unscholarly dereliction.
From another point of view the foregoing comments may perhaps do the
book an injustice. Policy matters aside, the author's deductions are invari-
ably sound. The non-lawyer will find the volume an easily understandable
exposition and even the lawyer seeking the general arguments pro and con
on various points will find it a convenient source of information. He may
also find the bibliography and the collection of voting trust provisions dis-
tinctly helpful.
JOHN F. MEcK, JRt
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES. By Howard L.
Smith and Underhill Moore. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1941. Fourth
Edition. Pp. lxiv, 1070. $6.00.
SMITH AND MooRE's first casebook on Bills and Notes was published
more than thirty years ago. A second edition was published in 1922, and
a third edition in 1932. During these thirty years this work has become a
standard law school casebook in the field of negotiable instruments, and
deservedly so.
This outstanding work is now ready in a new and improved fourth edition
by Professor Underhill Moore of the Yale Law School. In its scope and
arrangement, this edition does not differ materially from the earlier ones.
But several important problems are raised for the first time. Thus, cases
on Travelers' checks, such as American Express Company v. Anadarco Bank
& Trust Company,' are introduced. Certain aspects of the relation between
drawer and drawee - which may seem to have no recognized place in the
negotiable instruments law- are also initially treated. For example, the
duty of a depositor to examine periodic statements of his account and his
cancelled checks and to notify the bank if his name has been forged on any
returned check is considered in McCormick v. Rapid City National Bank.2
Again, the chapter on Acceptance begins with the excellent illustrative case
of First National Bank of Jackson v. Hargis Commercial Bank & Trust Co.,8
which deals with a question, only indirectly covered in prior editions, of
whether a check operates as an assignment of any part of the funds to the
credit of the drawer with the bank. One feature of the problem involved
" Associate Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
1. 179 Okla. 606, 67 P. (2d) 55 (1937).
2. 293 N. W. 819 (S. D. 1940).
3. 170 Ky. 690, 186 S. W. 471 (1916).
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in instruments which do not satisfy the formal requisites prescribed by the
statute for negotiable instruments but wlich are, nevertheless, in view of
some of their stipulations, held negotiable by contract or estoppel is illustrated
by the English case of Hibernian Bank, Ltd. v. Gyson and Hanson.4 The
effect of a provision for renewals in a note is presented by the Canadian
case of Ross v. Empire Construction & Investment Co., Ltd.,5 and the
problem of the "imposter-payee" is treated in a new aspect in Halsey v. Bank
of New York & Trust Company.0
The chapters on Acceptance and Value have been greatly expanded and
numerous modem cases have been inserted to raise the new problems in
these fields. The general scheme of the cases, which is especially apparent
in the Acceptance chapter, is designed to present the problems from the
standpoint of the practicing lawyer. For example, there are numerous cases
dealing with the liability of a drawee as a constructive acceptor by conduct
or by negligence in effecting collection. - Furthermore, problems underlying
the issuance of irrevocable letters of credit are more fully treated.8 Questions
of current account and set off between bank and customer are presented
through an excellent series of selected cases.9 And the material on the
liability to a bank or to its receiver of a person, who for the accommodation
of the bank, executes an instrument which is in form a binding obligation,
is expanded.' 0
Many new cases, decided during the last ten years, have been included
in this fourth edition to illustrate various legal propositions in lieu of earlier
cases that had been utilized in the prior editions. Instead of the earlier
South Carolina case of Putnam v. Crymes" to illustrate words of nego-
tiability, this new edition begins with the Texas case of City National Ban
& Trust Co. of Corpus Christi v. Pyramid Asbestos & Roofing Co.'- Instead
of using such cases as Josselyn v. Lacier13 and Carlos v. Fancourt" to present
4. 2 K. B. 384 (1938).
5. 1 W. NV. R. 714 (1932).
6. 270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936).
7. Pp. 238-49. Mitchell Live Stock Auction Co. v. Bryant State Bank, 65 S. D.
488, 275 N. IV. 262 (1937) ; Robert v. School District No. 1, 99 Colo. 484, 63 P. (2d)
1232 (1936); First Nat. Bank of Portage v. Wisconsin Nat. Bank of "WVatert.wn, 210
Vis. 533, 246 N. IV. 593 (1933); Canal Bank & Trust Co. v. Denny, 172 La. 40,
135 So. 376 (1931); Decatur Creamery Co. v. West Side Trust & Say. Bank, 213 Ill.
App. 220 (1919).
8. Continental Nat. Bank v. National City Bank of New York, 69 F. (2d) 312
(C.C.A. 9th, 1934).
9. Pp. 464-76. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Federation Bank & Trust Co.,
174 Misc. 206, 20 N. Y. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Bank of Metropolis v. New England
Bank, 1 How. 234 (U. S. 1843); Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 16 Col (2d) 169, 105 P. (2d) 118 (1940); Kardun v. Willing, 102 F. (2d)
957 (C.C.A. 3d, 1938).
10. P. 340 et seq.
11. 1 M. C. Mul. 9 (1940).
12. 39 S. W. (2d) 1101 (1931).
13. 10 Mod. 294, 317 (K. B. 1715).
14. 5 T. R. 482 (K. B. 1794).
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problems of payment out of a particular fund, the new edition uses the
recent Louisiana case of Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Miller.1 Instead
of the venerable Cooke v. Colehan,16 dealing with the negotiability of an
instrument payable at a specified period after death, this edition includes
the recent Kentucky case of Murrell 'v. Gibbs' Administrator.17 And on the
theft of an incomplete negotiable instrument and its negotiation by a holder
in due course, instead of the familiar Baxendale v. Bennett,'8 the recent cases
of Heimberg v. Lincoln National Bank"9 and Thomas v. Standard Accident
& Insurance Co.20 are used.
On the other hand, this reviewer misses some of the old familiar faces.
Miller v. Race2 ' always seemed an excellent case to present the problem
of negotiability. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany22 is reduced to a footnote.
This reviewer also regrets, if for none other than pedagogical reasons, the
elimination from the new edition of the cases dealing with the fictitious
payee doctrine.2 Again, on the subject of the negotiability of trade accept-
ances, although the Massachusetts case of State Trading Corporation v.
Toepfert24 which is used in the new edition reviews the authorities, the
inclusion, as in the third edition, of the two Texas cases of Lane Co. v.
CrunL25 and Arrington v. Mercantile Protection Bureau20 seemed preferable.
But after all, these are only details in which individual instructor preferences
are bound to play a determining part.
A new feature of this fourth edition is the introductory section which
contains forty pages of facsimile forms of typical documents and credit instru-
ments that are used in business for the creation and transfer of deposit
currency. These forms are arranged in such a way as to take the student
through a standard transaction from start to finish. The appendix of the
fourth edition contains not only the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act but
also the Bank Collection Code. The Uniform Fiduciary's Act might well have
been included too.
It has been suggested that law curricula do not offer the prospective lawyer
a sufficient acquaintance with the law of banking transactions. Professor
Aigler's casebook, for example, presents a selection of cases on the law of
15. 172 So. 557 (1937).
16. 2 Strange 1217 (K. B. 1744).
17. 275 Ky. 124, 120 S. W. (2d) 1018 (1938).
18. 3 Q. B. D. 525 (1878).
19. 113 N. J. Laws 76, 176 Atl. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
20. 7 F. Supp. ?05 (1934).
21. 1 Burr. 452 (K. B. 1758).
22. P. 667, n. 17.
23. Coggill v. American Exchange Bank, 1 N. Y. 113 (1847); Seaboard Nat. Bank
v. Bank of America, 51 Misc. 103, 100 N. Y. Supp. 740 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Trust Co.
of America v. Hamilton Bank of New York City, 127 App. Div. 515, 112 N. Y. Supp.
84 (1st Dep't 1908).
24. 304 Mass. 473, 23 N. E. (2d) 1008 (1939).
25. 291 S. W. 1084 (1927).
26. 24 S. W. (2d) 383 (1930).
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"Negotiable Paper and Banking." But if cases on banking are to be included
it would seem that they should be integrated with the bills and notes cases
as a unified whole and not merely presented as an independent part of a
casebook. In any event, some aspects of the collection problem presented
by such cases as City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,'--
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Malloygs and Jennings v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,201 might well be included in any case book
on Bills and Notes in order to familiarize the student with the problems
involved.
But the difficulty of suggesting treatment of omitted material and more
detailed treatment of other matters is that casebooks already contain tot
much material for the time ordinarily allotted. For example, the first edition
of Smith and Moore's casebook on Bills and Notes contained 7G9 pages
and 332 cases, the second edition contained 799 pages and 337 cases, the
third edition contained 918 pages and 365 cases, and the fourth edition
contains 1012 pages and 401 cases. But reviewers are rarely consistent.
They "view with alarm" the ever increasing number of pages and cases,
yet suggest new material that should have been included without indicating
what material should have been omitted in lieu thereof.
On the general problem of arrangement, some workers in the field of
Bills and Notes and related subjects prefer that the liability of the parties
should be treated before cases on formal requisites of the concept of nego-
tiability. As a practical matter, the instructor must take up both together,
without regard to which subjects appear first in the casebook. Other teachers
believe there should be more emphasis on the economic aspects of com-
mercial paper, including corporate bonds, interim certificates and security
receipts,30 and that bills and notes should be incorporated in a larger course
devoted to commercial and investment paper and to bank credit. But to
argue the pros and cons on both of these questions would convert this from
a book review into a controversial treatise.
This reviewer was a student in Professor Underhill Moore's Bills and
Notes class at Columbia Law School more than twenty years ago. Largely
through the inspiration of that student experience he has retained, as a
practicing lawyer, an undiminished interest in the subject. "First-rateness"
characterizes everything Professor Moore has done, both in and out of the
classroom. The new edition of this excellent work provides a most teachable
collection of available materials and there is little doubt that it will enjoy the
wide use and general approval that was accorded to its worthy predecessors.
LESTER A. JAFFEt
27. 271 U. S. 4S9 (1926).
28. 264 U. S. 160 (1924).
29. 294 U. S. 216 (1935).
30. See President & Directors of ,Manbattan Co. v. M1organ, 242 N. Y. 33, 1 0
N. E. 594 (1926).
t Member of the Cincinnati Bar.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. By Edwin Borchard. Cleveland: Banks-Baldwin
Law Publishing Co., 1941. Second Edition. Pp. xxxvii, 1152. $22.50.
HAVING reviewed the first edition of this book in this Journal in 1935,1 it
would probably now be sufficient to say that the second edition maintains the
high standard of the first, and that the new edition fully covers all decisions
rendered and statutes enacted since 1934. The preface to the second edition
correctly indicates the thorough revision of the first edition by the statement
that:
"Some 400 pages have had to be added to the text of the old
edition. Entirely new chapters on Jurisdiction, Parties, Taxation,
Public Officers, Insurance Policies, Patents, the Civil Adjudication
of 'Penal' Legislation and Forms have been added and most of the
old chapters have been greatly revised."
When the first edition appeared the declaratory judgment was relatively
new in many of the states which had authorized it, and had just been author-
ized in the federal courts. The first edition has done much to aid in the
initiation of declaratory judgment procedure. It is fortunate that the first
treatise upon the subject should have been prepared by an author who was
most influential in obtaining its adoption, and that this author may now by a
new edition steer correctly the use of the declaratory judgment. The value
of the second edition for this purpose is increased by the inclusion of forms
which did not appear in the first edition.
Professor Borchard's volume is not merely a practitioner's handbook, but
also a scholarly treatise which presents the historical background of the de-
claratory judgment, and a thorough analysis of its place in judicial procedure.
He correctly points out the danger which presents itself through a tendency
of the courts to give a narrow and technical construction to statutes providing
new methods of procedure.
Throughout his book the author points out the defects of judicial procedure
and the advantages of declaratory judgments. Much may be accomplished
through the declaratory judgment, and the new edition of Professor Bor-
chard's book should have an influence in obtaining its adoption by the nine
states which have not already provided for its use. But the author properly
recognizes that the declaratory judgment alone will not solve the problems of
judicial procedure. The adoption of a more simplified procedure and of more
uniform standards, which has been accomplished recently in the federal
courts, contributes much, but the lawyers and the courts must unite in bring-
ing about a better judicial organization, with simpler and prompter methods
of administering justice. Worship of technicalities necessarily characterizes
those who have spent their lives in the application of technicalities, but the
lawyers must awake to the primary problems of administering justice, or
else the layman must seek to reform judicial organization and judicial pro-
cedure.
WAL'TER F. DODD t
1. (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 715.
tMember of the Illinois Bar, formerly Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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